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A DIALOGUE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW
ROGER HUNTERf
ROBERT KLONOFFff

F

EW PRINCIPLES HAVE RECEIVED AS LITTLE ANALYSIS by courts 1 and commentators 2 as the principle that
nonlawyers may not practice law. Each state has a comprehensive statutory scheme restricting the practice of law to
lawyers and providing penalties to deter unauthorized practice. I Moreover, in every state, court decisions have made
clear that statutory provisions governing unauthorized law
practice are not merely idle phrases.4 The purposes behind
these statutes and court decisions appear, at first glance, to
be unassailable:
The public, far more than the lawyers, suffers injury
from unauthorized practice of law. The fight to stop
it is the public's fight. No man is required to
employ a lawyer if he does not wish to. But every
man is entitled to receive legal advice from men
skilled in law, qualified by character, sworn to mainf B.A., West Virginia University, 1975; J.D., Yale Law School, 1979. Member, Ohio Bar.
ft B.A., University of California (Berkeley), 1976; J.D., Yale Law School, 1979; law clerk
to the Hon. John R. Brown, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Both authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Professors Arthur A. Leff and Quinton
Johnstone of Yale Law School who provided them with many helpful comments and suggestions
concerning drafts of this article; however, responsibility for its content rests with the authors.
1. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 173 (1967). The authors
indicate that the courts "have failed to sufficiently explore and articulate the goals they are
working towards in allocating functions to the bar and its competitors. Nor have they fully
considered the implications of the goals that they apparently do articulate." Id. For some representative decisions, see State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n v. Osborne, 241 Ind. 375, 172
N.E.2d 434 (1961); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951).
2. For examples of the willingness of commentators to accept without critical analysis the
rationale underlying the prohibition against law practice by laymen, see Davis, Unauthorized
Practice of Law and the Public Interest in the Qualified Lawyer, UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS, December, 1955, at 4; Kephart, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 40 DICK. L. REv. 225 (1936). But
see Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy: A Struggle Among Power Groups, 4 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1 (1955) (critically assessing purposes behind unauthorized practice statutes);
Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures?, 5 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 104
(1938) (critical examination of traditional premises supporting prohibition of the unauthorized
practice of law).
3. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.901, .904 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-1-26 (1970). See generally UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK 6-110 (J. Fisher & D.
Lachmann eds. 1972).
4. A representative sample of cases from all fifty states can be found in Resh, Unfounded
Attacks on Unauthorized Practice, 40 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS 272, 275-76 (1977).
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tain a high standard of professional ethics, and subject to the control and discipline of the court. Not
only this, he must be served disinterestedly by a
lawyer who is his lawyer, not motivated or con5
trolled by a divided or outside allegiance.
It is perhaps in recognition of the foregoing considerations
that few constitutional barriers have been imposed on the
6
ability of states to limit the practice of law.
This article is intended to demonstrate that the interests
underlying the unauthorized practice of law provisions have
not been analyzed thoroughly. To dramatize some of the issues that have received insufficient examination in the past,
this discussion is presented in the form of a dialogue7 in
which three individuals participate.
First is Mr. Layman, who has just been involved in an
automobile accident. Mr. Layman's automobile collided with
another vehicle, causing extensive damage to that vehicle and
seriously injuring a passenger. The driver, who escaped injury, is suing to recover for the damage done to his car. The
State of Dicta has informed Mr. Layman that it will indict
him for involuntary manslaughter if the passenger fails to
survive; relatives of the passenger have indicated that
he intends to sue for personal injuries. Mr. Layman wishes
to hire a lay adjuster to handle the civil claims and to use his
son, an English professor, to defend any possible criminal
charges. Second is Mr. Legislator, a member of the Judiciary
Committee of the General Assembly of the State of Dicta and
co-author of that state's unauthorized practice of law statute.
Third is Mr. Lawyer, chairman of the State Bar Association's
Committee on Ethics. Mr. Lawyer strongly believes in the
soundness of Canon 3 of the American Bar Association's
Code of Professional Responsibility,8 which provides: "A
5. Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, Report, 66 A.B.A. REP. 268
(1941), quoted in Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 639, 5 N.W.2d 914, 922 (1942) (emphasis added).
6. But see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1974) (establishing a constitutional right of
self-representation in criminal cases and condemning the state court for forcing petitioner to accept a state-appointed public defender); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (the state may
not validly enforce a regulation which absolutely bars prison inmates from furnishing other
prisoners with assistance in preparing writs of habeas corpus).
7. The primary purpose of this article and the dialogue format is to stimulate critical
analysis and discussion of the various issues discussed herein. For an excellent example of the
use of the dialogue approach, see generally Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
8. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1978) [hereinafter referred to as ABA
CODE]
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lawyer should assist in preventing the unauthorized practice
of law."9 Mr. Layman has asked Mr. Lawyer and Mr.
Legislator to meet with him so he can discuss with them his
plans for tackling his legal problems. 10
MR. LAYMAN: I'll give it to both of you straight. I'm in a bind; I've
just been involved in a car accident. The driver is suing me for
damage to his car, an injured passenger is suing me for personal
injuries, and the State of Dicta has threatened to bring criminal
charges if the passenger dies. I can't afford a lawyer but I'm not
eligible for legal aid. I want to hire Mr. Augustus F. Mazzacaro, 1 1 a licensed casualty adjuster, to handle my civil matter. He
believes he can reach a settlement with the victims and intends
to charge me only $15 an hour for his time. My son, an articulate
professor of English, plans to represent me free of charge in my
criminal case, if there is one. He's not a lawyer either. I trust
these men. Indeed, I think they would serve me better than any
lawyer could.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Your intention to use nonlawyers is simply out of
the question. This state prohibits nonlawyers from practicing
law.' 2 Quite clearly, both gentlemen would be engaging in the
practice of law,' 3 and unauthorized practice is not excused
14
merely because a fee is not being charged for the service.
MR. LAYMAN: But why can't these men assist me? It seems absurd
that I can't be helped by men of my choice.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Mr. Lawyer, perhaps you can explain it better
than I. The American Bar Association strongly believes that the
practice of law should be limited to lawyers, does it not?
MR. LAWYER: It does. Indeed, a lawyer can be disciplined or disbarred for encouraging the unauthorized practice of law in any

9. ABA CODE, supra note 8, Canon 3.
10. Footnotes are intended to provide background material. They are not necessarily meant
to be attributed to the character who is speaking when the reference appears.
11. See Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 465 Pa. 545, 351 A.2d 229 (1976). In the
actual case, Mazzacaro worked for plaintiffs, not defendants, and operated on a contingent fee
basis. Id. at 547, 351 A.2d at 230.
12. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
13. See Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 465 Pa. 545, 555, 351 A.2d 229, 234
(1976) (settling of tort claims involves practice of law even though the nonlawyer always settled
cases out of colurt or else turned matters over to an attorney); Lake Shore Management Co. v.
Blum, 92 111.App. 2d 47, 235 N.E.2d 366 (1968) (appearing in a court of law clearly constitutes
practice of law; only lawyers can represents others in court).
14. See Grievance Comm. of State Bar v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). But
see Darby v. Mississippi Bd. of Admissions, 185 So. 2d 684 (Miss. 1966) (although one need not
charge a fee to be engaged in the practice of law, absence of a fee may be considered in
analyzing whether particular activity is in fact practice of law).
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way.' 5 I should make clear that the rule limiting law practice is
not designed to aid lawyers; the self-interest of the legal profession plays no role whatsoever here. 16 The sole interest at stake
is the public interest. 17 Don't you see, Mr. Layman, the rule is
meant to help you. It's for your own good!
MR. LAYMAN: Can you explain how the rule protects the public?
MR. LAWYER: Certainly. The rule is the best assurance that the legal
problems of the public will be handled by those with adequate
legal training. A legal education provides one with an understanding of legal principles, the ability to spot legal problems,
and the skill necessary to research difficult and complex legal
questions.' 8 Bar examinations and licensing make sure that
everyone authorized to practice law has these basic skills. In addition, when the public uses licensed attorneys it uses men and
women who are subject to strict rules of ethical conduct and to
the supervision of the courts.1 9 Finally, when a person takes a
problem to a lawyer, he or she gets the protection of the
attorney-client privilege so that all disclosures to the attorney will
20
be held in secret.
15. See ABA CODE, supra note 8, DR .3-101. Disciplinary Rule 3-101(A) provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law." Id. The Code contains
both disciplinary rules, which "state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action," and ethical considerations, which are "aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive." Id., Preamble and Preliminary Statement.
16. The case law is virtually unanimous in asserting that the prohibition against unauthorized practice is not based upon the self-interest of the legal profession. See, e.g., Darby v.
Mississippi Bd. of Educ., 185 So. 2d 684 (Miss. 1966); In re Community Action for Legal
Servs., Inc., 26 A.D.2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1968). But cf. Littleton v. Langlois, 37 Wis. 2d
360, 155 N.W.2d 150 (1967) (preventing competition with legal profession "proper factor" to
consider).
17. Nearly every case considering unauthorized practice of law prohibitions clearly states
that the interests of the public are being promoted by such a rule. See, e.g., Dacey v. New
York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 290 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 423 F.2d 188 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Holland, 411 S.W.2d 674 (1967);
Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 465 Pa. 545, 351 A.2d 229 (1976). See also ABA
CODE, supra note 8, EC 3-1. Ethical Consideration 3-1 provides:
The prohibition against the practice of law by a layman is grounded in the need of the
public for integrity and competence of those who undertake to render legal services.
Because of the fiduciary and personal character of the lawyer-client relationship and the
inherently complex nature of our legal system, the public can better be assured of the
requisite responsibility and competence if the practice of law is confined to those who are
subject to the requirements and regulations imposed upon members of the legal profession.
Id. But see Johnstone, supra note 2, at 5 (maintaining that lawyers support unauthorized practice rules at least in part to restrict "the number of lawyers so as to provide higher incomes for
those who are authorized to practice").
18. See generally Davis, supra note 2, at 6 (discussing purposes for prohibiting law practice
by nonlawyers).
19. See ABA CODE, supra note 8, EC 3-3.
20. Id.
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In other words, what the two of you are telling me is
that I have to hire a lawyer for my own good?
MR. LAWYER: No, not at all. I've not yet informed you of an important exception to the prohibition of law practice by nonlawyers.
You can handle these cases yourself.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Is that a correct statement of the law?
MR. LAWYER: It is. Courts have always recognized that one can represent himself.2 1 In fact, the Code of Professional Responsibility
itself acknowledges this principle. 22 Indeed, at least with respect to criminal matters, a defendant has a constitutional right
to represent himself. The leading case on this point is Farettav.
California.23 Let me read to you what the United States Supreme Court stated in that decision: "We confront here a nearly
universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our
courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do
MR. LAYMAN:

SO." 24

MR. LAYMAN: Wait a minute, I'm confused. First you tell me that the
rule prohibiting law practice by nonlawyers is meant to protect
the public. Now you tell me that I can represent myself. Yet Mr.
Mazzacaro knows a good deal more about tort claims than I do.
And my son is much more articulate than I am and could make a
better case for me than I could make for myself. Indeed, I'd
probably make a fool of myself if I tried to handle these cases
alone. 25 This whole thing makes no sense. 2 6 Certainly you
can't claim that I have the legal expertise necessary to handle my
cases.
MR. LAWYER: That's not the issue. I think the United States Supreme Court made sense out of things in the Faretta case. Let me
continue [he reads]:
21. See, e.g., Roddis v. All-Coverage Ins. Exch., 250 Cal. App. 2d 304, 58 Cal. Rptr. 530
(1967); Lake Shore Management Co. v. Blum, 92 I11. App. 2d 47, 235 N.E.2d 366 (1968); cf.
Mazique v. Mazique, 356 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 981 (1966) (when one
appears pro se, he is held to the rules of court conduct and procedure applicable to lawyers).
22. ABA CODE, supra note 8, EC 3-7. Ethical Consideration 3-7 states, in pertinent part,
that "[t]he prohibition against a nonlawyer practicing law does not prevent a layman from representing himself." Id.
23. 422 U.S. 806 (1974).
24. Id. at 817.
25. See id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In rejecting the majority's recognition of a
constitutional right to self-representation in criminal cases, Justice Blackmun asserted that "[i]f
there is any truth to the old proverb that 'one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client,' the
Court by its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right on one to make a fool of himself."
Id. (emphasis supplied by Justice Blackmun).
26. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV.
702, 708 (1977) ("Once one agrees that a layman can choose self-representation, it becomes
diflicult to argue that he should be unable to seek counsel on legal issues from a nonlawyer").
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[W]here the defendant will not voluntarily accept representation
by counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer's training and experience can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly. To force a
lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law
contrives against him. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that in
some rare instances, the defendant might in fact present his case
more effectively by conducting his own defense. Personal liberties
are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the
personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. . . . H]is choice must be honored out of ". . . respect for the individual ...."27
MR.

You've cleared up nothing. I am no less convinced that
the law is "contriving against me" when I'm told that I either
have to represent myself or hire a lawyer but that I may not
obtain assistance from a nonlawyer. Moreover, to the extent that
a defendant may occasionally perform better than a lawyer, is it
not equally likely that a nonlawyer selected by a defendant may
perform better than a lawyer? Indeed, Mr. Mazzacaro and my
son clearly would perform better than I could. Finally, how is
"respect for the individual" fostered when I am prohibited from
choosing whomever I want to represent me? I've expressed my
desire to have nonlawyers represent me. I'm the only person
who could possibly be harmed by my choice. 28 Why won't the
law respect my right to make such a choice?
MR. LEGISLATOR: As I recall from my political science days, that great
spokesman for individual liberties, John Stuart Mill, believed that
when only the individual is affected by his conduct, then the
government may not prohibit or restrain that conduct. 2 9 He
recognized that "[a]ll errors which he [the individual] is likely to
commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the
evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his
good." 3 0 I guess that to the extent we follow Mill's thinking,
Mr. Layman's argument for individual choice has merit.
LAYMAN:

27. 422 U.S. at 834, quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
28. Cf. ABA CODE, supra note 8, EC 3-7 ("The prohibition against a nonlawyer practicing
law does not prevent a layman from representing himself, for then he is ordinarily exposing only
himself to possible injury").
29. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 75-76 (A. Castell ed. 1947).
30. Id. at 77.
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I have two responses. First, as a practical matter, we
don't follow the teachings of Mill. Second, even within Mill's
framework, the state would be able to prohibit law practice by
nonlawyers, since the conduct of the nonlawyer does affect other
individuals. Turning to the first point, if our society took Mill's
analysis seriously, then any rules regulating conduct which affects
only the individual would be untenable: all narcotics laws would
go up in smoke; social security programs would retire from the
scene; compulsory medical treatment requirements would die
out; governments could no longer buckle down on seat belt requirements; the...
MR. LAYMAN: Okay! Okay! But all you're saying is that a line must be
drawn somewhere between individual choice and governmental
restrictions of choice. 3 ' For example, the government in effect
forces consumers to pay extra for new cars because the cars must
be equipped with seat belts. However, there is no law forcing
people to wear them. 3 2 And how important are seat belts anyway? Couldn't more lives be saved by further restricting consumer choice and requiring crash-proof steel cars rather than by
simply requiring that all new cars have seat belts? So, even in a
life and death situation, the government does not absolutely limit
an individual's choice. 3 3 In the provision of legal services, however, we're not even talking about a life and death matter, except
when one is on trial for a capital crime. And in a capital case, as
in other criminal cases, the government is constitutionally prohibited from forcing a lawyer on a defendant who does not want
one. 3 4 So once again, I ask: why won't the law respect my right
to individual choice when I wish to be represented by a nonlawyer?
MR. LAWYER: If you accept the fact that we draw lines, then I submit we should leave the line where it is. Turning to my second
point, having answered you on the first, I recall from my political
MR. LAWYER:

31. See Comment, Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart Mill,
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 621 (1970) (noting that line-drawing problems arise in applying Mill to
concrete situations).
32. Id. at 609 n.24.
33. See Calabresi, The Decisionfor Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs,
78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1965). The author maintains that "[olur society is not committed to
preserving life at any cost ....
[L]ives are used up when the quid pro quo is not some great
moral principle but 'convenience.' Ventures are undertaken that, statistically at least, are certain
to cost lives." Id.
34. 422 U.S. at 836. Although Faretta did not involve capital punishment, nothing in that
decision indicates that the result would have been different had the death penalty been involved.
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science days that Mill also stated that "[a]s soon as any part of a
person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it." 3 5 The issue is not the consequence
of an isolated exercise of individual choice; rather, the issue is
the impact upon the public of a rule granting the freedom to
choose nonlawyer representation. Nonlawyers clearly will harm a
large number of people because of their lack of training and freedom from any ethical restraints. Therefore, it is permissible for
society to interfere with an individual's right to choose a nonlawyer to represent him.
MR. LEGISLATOR: You're misreading Mill. The focus must be on the
actor and his conduct rather than upon the rule which makes his
36
conduct possible.
MR. LAWYER: Even assuming that the focus is on the actor and his
conduct, I'm still correct. Let's focus on conduct, the conduct of
the nonlawyer advisor. The advisor's conduct harms others,
namely the clients, by depriving them of the skilled, ethical, and
professional representation which they would otherwise receive. 37 So Mill would support the distinction currently made in
the law: one can represent himself because he harms only himself,3 8 but a nonlawyer can be forbidden from representing-and
hence, harming-others. So let's pack it up and call it a day.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Not so fast! You're confusing the idea of acting
with that of advising another to act. As I understand it, a lawyer
advises a client how to act, but ultimately, the decision rests with
the client. 39 And Mill makes clear that "[w]hatever it is permit40
ted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do."

35. See J.S. MILL, supra note 29, at 75.
36. Id.
37. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
38. See also ABA CODE, supra note 8, EC 3-7, quoted in note 28 supra.
39. See ABA CODE, supra note 8, EC 7-8. Ethical Consideration 7-8 reveals that the lawyer
is not the one engaging in actions, but is merely the advisor who must ensure that the client
knows "the possible effect of each legal alternative" and the "factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible." Id. In essence, the ultimate decision
rests with the client. See id.
40. J.S. MILL, supra note 29, at 100. Arguably, the statement quoted by Mr. Legislator in
the text is an over-generalization since the next sentence in Mill's text states: "The question is
doubtful only when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice; when he makes it
his occupation, for subsistance or pecuniary gain, to promote what society and the State consider to be an evil." Id. It is the authors' belief that Mill, in this passage, did not intend
generally to prohibit the act of advising for pay, but merely intends to prohibit such action
when it encourages the individual to engage in conduct which is evil according to the societal
view. Thus, Mill would allow a lawyer or nonlawyer to advise a client to enter into a contract,
but would not allow the nonlawyer or lawyer to tell the client to take illegal narcotics or to
murder.
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MR. LAWYER: Come on; you're really groping now. You know as well
as I do that lawyers make all the decisions. Why else would individuals come to lawyers in the first place?
MR. LEGISLATOR: Well, if clients don't make the decisions, I think
they should. Lawyers should simply advise them of the alterna41
tives available.
MR. LAYMAN: From what you two have said, I'm not sure how Mill
would come out on the matter. But what does his philosophy
have to do with this issue anyway?
MR. LEGISLATOR: Studying the ideas of past philosophers is sometimes helpful, but I agree that these ideas cannot be the last
word in examining the wisdom of the current law.
MR. LAYMAN: Okay, but if we're looking at the wisdom of the current
law prohibiting unauthorized law practice, then I have some
pressing questions.
MR. LAWYER: Proceed.
MR. LAYMAN: Suppose the choice is between employing the assistance of a layman or self-representation. That is, suppose an individual cannot afford a lawyer and a court won't appoint one for
him. Is he then forced to handle his own case?
MR. LAWYER: That seems to be the situation in the few instances I
know of.42 The only exception to this rule is that prisoners can
receive help from their fellow inmates in filing habeas corpus petitions when the state refuses to provide a lawyer for such inmates. 43 Don't ask me why the Supreme Court has made an
exception here and nowhere else. 4
41. See generally D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974) (concluding, based on comprehensive empirical studies, that a client should have a much more
active role in the attorney-client relationship than he has had traditionally). Cf. J. KATZ & M.
CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? 91-115 (1975) (advocating greater
role for patient in making decisions concerning treatment of catastrophic diseases). See also note
39 supra.
42. See Hackin v. Arizona, 102 Ariz. 218, 220, 427 P.2d 910, 912 appeal dismissed per
curiam, 389 U.S. 143 (1967) (even though the court did not appoint a lawyer, Hackin was found
guilty of unauthorized practice of law for helping another in drafting a habeas corpus petition).
Accord, Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975), affd sub nom. Pilla
v. American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976). The Turner court held that there is no
constitutional right to lay assistance in legal matters under either the first or sixth amendments.
407 F. Supp. at 476-80. The court found that § 1654 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Code, enacted to enforce the sixth amendment's guarantee of a right to counsel, only allows for
two types of representation: that by an attorney and that by a person representing himself. Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976). Although the Supreme Court has ruled that fellow prisoners may
aid each other in filing habeas corpus petitions, the principles stated in Hackin are still valid in
all cases apart from those in which habeas corpus petitions are involved. See Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969); note 43 and accompanying text infra.
43. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969).
44. See id. at 485. In Avery, the Court emphasized that "[s]ince the basic purpose of the
writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that
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What if I could demonstrate that a nonlawyer in a
particular situation is actually more qualified-or at least as
45
qualified-as a lawyer?
MR. LAWYER: It would be too burdensome on the courts to make a
case-by-case determination of qualifications. Besides, I suspect
that nonlawyers are almost never as qualified as lawyers.
Moreover, even if a particular individual is qualified, what happens if this nonlawyer walks off with a client's money or discloses
a client's secrets? You must remember that the Code of Profes46
sional Responsibility applies only to lawyers.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Mr. Lawyer, even though I helped draft the statute prohibiting law practice by nonlawyers, I must point out that
you're overstating your case in at least two ways. First, in noting
that the Code of Professional Responsibility applies only to
lawyers, you fail to point out that enforcement of the Code
through disciplinary action is rare indeed.4 7 Back-scratching and
a reluctance on the part of lawyers to "offend" fellow lawyers
have led to inadequate enforcement of the Code, as the American Bar Association itself has recognized. 48 Second, I think you
underestimate the capabilities of individuals who are not members of your beloved profession. 49 Take patent cases, for examMR. LAYMAN:

access of prisoners to the courts for the purposes of presenting their complaints may not be
denied or obstructed." Id. The majority further maintained that "[i]n the case of all except those
who are able to help themselves-usually a few old hands or exceptionally gifted prisonersthe prisoner is, in effect, denied access to the courts unless such help [within the prison walls]
is available." Id. at 488.
45. In many of the cases in which the issue of unauthorized practice is raised, there is no
question concerning the quality of the nonlawyer's work. For example, in one case, an accountant was found to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal.
App. 2d 807, 820, 273 P.2d 619, 631 (1954). In fact, it appears that the accountant did a
commendable job of handling the client's tax matter; he succeeded in obtaining an enormous tax
savings for the client, and successfully defended the tax calculations before the tax authorities.
Id. at 810-11, 273 P.2d at 621-22.
46. See ABA CODE supra note 8, EC 3-3. Ethical consideration 3-3 provides:
A non-lawyer who undertakes to handle legal matters is not governed as to integrity or
legal competence by the same rules that govern the conduct of a lawyer. A lawyer is not
only subject to that regulation but also is committed to high standards of ethical conduct.
The public interest is best served in legal matters by a regulated professional committed
to such standards ....
id.
47. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970) [hereinafter cited as
ABA SPECIAL COMM.]. The committee reported the "existence of a scandalous situation" in
which "[d]isciplinary action is practically nonexistence in many jurisdictions; practices and procedures are antiquated; and many disciplinary agencies have little power to take effective steps
against malefactors." Id. at 1.
48. See id. See generally J. LIEBERMAN, CRISES AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL ETHICS
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 197-211 (1978).
49. See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Edue., 386 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1029 (1968) (the court upheld school policy of not allowing attorneys to represent junior
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ple. 50 I'd hire an engineer over a lawyer any day. And I'd certainly
rather have an accountant than a lawyer do my income taxes.
MR. LAWYER: It's not so much a narrow area of expertise that matters; what matters is that a lawyer has a legal education. Let me
read to you what the Minnesota Supreme Court has said about
this:
The interest of the public is not protected by the narrow specialization of an individual who lacks the perspective and orientation
which comes only from a thorough knowledge and understanding
of basic legal concepts, of legal processes, and of the interrelation
51
of the law in all its branches.
In essence, law school teaches one to "think like a lawyer," and
thinking like a lawyer is essential to high quality law practice.
MR. LAYMAN: Accepting for the moment the idea that nonlawyers
cannot practice law, I'm confused about what actually constitutes
the practice of law. I'm willing to assume that a nonlawyer trying
a criminal case or negotiating a settlement in a tort claim constitutes unauthorized law practice, but what about the employment
of nonlawyers in other areas?
MR. LAWYER: Such as?
MR. LAYMAN: Such as
MR. LAWYER: That

the preparation of income tax forms.
probably doesn't constitute unauthorized

52
practice-at least if only simple matters are involved.
MR. LAYMAN: What about the research necessary to obtain tax savings, when such research is performed in the course of filling out
tax returns? You know, like those services that advertise on television.
MR. LAWYER: You mean the person is hired to prepare tax forms but
sees a need to research a legal question in relation to such preparation?

MR. LAYMAN: Yes.

high school students in suspension conferences, maintaining that a social worker would be more
qualified than a lawyer for such a task).
50. See Sperry v. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963) (recognizing the high quality of
nonlawyer patent agents and upholding power of Congress to allow nonlawyers to practice before the U.S. Patent Office). For other examples of nonlawyers with strong qualifications and
expertise, see State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 95, 295 N.W. 381, 383-84 (1941)
(court recognized nonlawyer's strong qualifications in transportation rate area, but nonetheless
found unauthorized practice of law); In re New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 4 Misc. 2d 728,
729, 156 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (nonlawyer with vast knowledge of Mexican law
not allowed to advise American citizens on matters relating to Mexican law).
51. Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 480-81, 48 N.W.2d 788, 796 (1951).
52. See, e.g., Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943).
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It depends on the jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions,
mere "incidental" legal work related to nonlegal work does not
constitute the practice of law. 53 Other jurisdictions reject this
idea, focusing instead on the nature of the legal work performed,
54
not on whether or not it is incidental to nonlegal work.
MR. LAYMAN: What about those "do-it-yourself" divorce kits I've
been reading about lately? You know, the kits which provide the
necessary legal forms along with instructions for filling them
55
out.
MR. LAWYER: This too depends on the jurisdiction. Some states consider the sale of such kits to constitute unauthorized law prac57
tice; 56 other states do not.
MR. LAYMAN: What about the preparation of contracts by real estate
brokers?
58
MR. LAWYER: Again, jurisdictions differ.
MR. LAYMAN: I guess what you're telling me is that there is no wide
consensus as to what constitutes the practice of law.
MR. LAWYER: That's right. I don't think it's possible to define the
practice of'law in such a way as to fit all situations and activities.5 9 As a practical matter, courts must examine the facts of
each case to determine whether the particular conduct constitutes law practice. Since the facts of each case are unique, it is
not surprising that jurisdictions appear somewhat divided. 60
MR. LAYMAN: You've pretty much undercut your argument that a
case-by-case determination of qualifications of nonlawyers would
be too burdensome, haven't you? You certainly can't say that the
courts have avoided a case-by-case approach.
MR. LAWYER: Well, perhaps to a certain extent...
MR. LAWYER:

53. See, e.g., In re New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 273 A.D. 524, 537, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209,
220 (1948), affd mem., 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949) (court found unauthorized practice
of law by accountant doing legal research but indicated result would be different if research was
incidental to auditing books or filling out tax forms). For a discussion of the "incidental test" in a
variety of settings, see Johnstone, supra note 2, at 15.
54. See, e.g., Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 816, 273 P.2d 619, 625 (1954) (rejecting the "incidental" test).
55. See generally Note, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: an Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1977).
56. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1974).
57. See, e.g., Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Or. 552, 538 P.2d 913 (1975).
58. Compare Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 116, 120, 214 N.E.2d
771, 774 (1966) (allowing real estate broker to complete form contract of sale) with Florida Bar
v. Columbia Title, 197 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. 1967) (drafting sales contracts constitutes unauthorized
practice of law).
59. See Sparkman v. State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 77 N.M. 551, 554, 425 P.2d 313, 315
(1967).
60. See notes 53-59 and accompanying text supra.
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MR. LAYMAN: It seems to me that no matter how law practice is

defined, a heck of a lot of law is practiced by nonlawyers.
MR. LAWYER: What on earth do you mean?
MR. LAYMAN: Well, take Mr. Legislator, for example, who's sitting
there so quietly. He's not a lawyer; yet he practices law every
day.
MR. LEGISLATOR: What may I ask are you talking about?
MR. LAYMAN: I just happen to have here a newsletter you sent me
recently in which you describe what you've done for your constituents. According to the letter, you obtained a tax revenue ruling for a sole shareholder of a small corporation; in one phone
call you averted the need for a constituent to file a discrimination
suit against the school board by convincing the board to renew
that person's contract; you saved someone the trouble of appealing an adverse ruling by the Social Security Administration relating to medical disability by writing a letter; you ... 61
MR. LEGISLATOR: Okay, I get the point. But going to bat for constituents is an essential function of a legislator.
MR. LAYMAN: But aren't all the alleged dangers Mr. Lawyer referred
to earlier present here?
MR. LEGISLATOR: Legislators will do a good job. Good work on constituents' problems translates into votes.
MR. LAYMAN: And what about all of the ombudsmen who have been
appearing recently? Certainly these nonlawyers are practicing
law. Why there are ombudsmen to handle problems of prisoners, 6 2 ombudsmen to handle problems of nursing home residents, 63 ombudsmen to handle grievances.against state and local
agencies, 6 4 ombudsmen to handle problems of school students, 65
ombudsmen to handle problems of juvenile delinquents, 6 6 ombudsmen everywhere.

61. For a discussion of the "casework" role of United States Congressmen and Senators, see
Klonoff, The Congressman as Mediator Between Citizens and Government Agencies: Problems and
Prospects, 16 HARv. J. LEcIs. -_ (1979) (forthcoming). See also Jenrette, The Care and Feeding of a
U.S. Congressman, TrLkl, April, 1977, at 27, 28 ("The people who come to [members of Congress] for
help have no lawyer of their own ....
After exhausting their own resources they come to their
congressman as their concerned representative with federal government").
62. See 16 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.41 (West 1974) (creating the office of ombudsman for
the Minnesota State Department of Corrections).
63. See Klonoff, The Problems of Nursing Homes: Connecticut's Non-Response, 31 AD. L.
REv. 1 (1979).
64. See Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 845, 849 (1975).
65. Id. at 850-51.
66. See Silbert & Sussman, The Rights of Juveniles Confined in Training Schools and the
Experience of a Training School Ombudsman, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 605 (1974).
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MR. LEGISLATOR: I'm sure you're aware that ombudsmen do not go
into court. They serve as negotiators to avert litigation. I'd say to
that extent they're not practicing law.
MR. LAYMAN: But Mr. Lawyer seemed to indicate that, whatever it
means, the concept of law practice is not limited to going into
court. For example, the publishing of divorce kits may constitute
67
practicing law.

MR. LAWYER: Mr. Layman has a point. In one leading case, a
licensed casualty adjuster who was not a lawyer was deemed to
be engaged in the practice of law simply because he settled tort
claims on behalf of injured persons for a fee. 68 This was so even
though the adjuster claimed that he acted only when liability
clearly existed and when the tortfeasor was willing to settle; if the
tortfeasor was unwilling to settle, the adjuster always advised that
a lawyer be hired. 6 9 The court noted "the vital role that legal
assessments play in the negotiation process."70
MR. LEGISLATOR:

Again, ombudsmen are different. They are public

officials; they'll do a good job. We have nothing to worry about.
However, I can think of a host of nonlawyers who are, in effect,
allowed to practice law unabated. I'm referring to those countless
individuals who are permitted to appear before administrative
agencies on someone else's behalf. It seems clear that one practicing before an agency is no less engaged in law practice than
one appearing before a court. 7 ' And, believe it or not, laymen
are permitted to represent clients before such agencies and
commissions as the Interstate Commerce Commission, 7 2 the De74
partment of the Treasury, 73 the United States Patent Office,
and the National Labor Relations Board, 7 5 just to name a few.
67. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
68. Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 465 Pa. 545, 555, 351 A.2d 229, 234 (1976).
69. Id. at 548, 351 A.2d at 233.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Kephart, supra note 2, at 229. Chief Justice Kephart, formerly of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, stated:
While the judicial field is being narrowed and curtailed by the activities of arbitrators,
commissions and administrative bodies that are constantly increasing in number and before whom laymen are at times permitted to practice this is a positive infringement of the
lawyer's right. There is no distinction between the practice before such boards, and the
duties of a lawyer; all ultimatelyfind their way into the courts, and their preparationand
trial should be guarded by the same safeguards as in a court.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. See State ex rel. State Bar v. Keller, 21 Wis. 2d 100, 123 N.W.2d 905 (1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 964 (1964).
73. See Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954).
74. Sperry v. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
75. Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (Ch. 1947), aff'd, 142 N.J. Eq.
484, 59 A.2d 863 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
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MR. LAWYER: In most of the instances you cite, the states would love

to crack down, but the federal government can authorize nonlawyers to practice law before federal agencies and the states
cannot declare such practice illegal because of the supremacy
clause.
MR. LAYMAN: The what?
MR. LAWYER: The supremacy clause. 76 This part of the Constitution
requires states to carry out federal law, even when such law is
inconsistent with state law. 7 7 I should point out that with respect to state agencies, most cases consider lay representation to
78
constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
MR. LEGISLATOR: I can think of many other areas in whichwhether legally or illegally-much law practice is engaged in by
nonlawyers. First, real estate sales transactions often take place
with no participation by lawyers. 79 Second, much consumer protection work once handled by lawyers is now engaged in by nonlegal organizations. 8 0 Third, in the area of mutual funds and life
insurance, much work, seemingly legal in nature, is carried out
by nonlawyers. 81
MR. LAWYER: Perhaps enforcement of the unauthorized practice stat82
ute has been inadequate.

76. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
77. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963) (since a federal statute expressly permitted the Commission of Patents to authorize nonlawyers to practice before the
Patent Office, by virtue of the supremacy clause, Florida could not deny nonlawyers the right to
perform functions within the scope of federal authority); State ex rel. State Bar v. Keller, 21
Wis. 2d 100, 102-03, 123 N.W.2d 905, 907 (1963) (layman's appearance as representative of
others at hearings before Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized by his federal
license and could not be enjoined).
78. See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 94-95, 295 N.W. 381, 383 (1941)
(nonlawyers not allowed to practice law before state railroad agency); People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 I11. 346, 357, 8 N.E.2d 941, 94647 (1937) (nonawyers not allowed to
practice before workmen's compensation board); cf. Worker's Compensation Law, ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 81-1323(c) (1976) (nonlawyers may appear before workmen's compensation board). See
also Morgan, supra note 26, at 708 n.21 ("State courts have been more restrictive as regards
practice before state agencies").
79. Miller, Where Has the Practice of Law Gone?, 39 UNAUrtH. PRAc. NEWS 40, 41 (1974).
80. Id. at 42.
81. Id. at 41.
82. This is not to say that numerous instances of enforcement cannot be found. See, e.g.,
Grievance Comm. of Bar v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 142, 222 A.2d 339, 346 (1966) (estate planner and
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MR. LAYMAN: Or perhaps complaints are not made in most situations
83
because the nonlawyers are doing an adequate job.
MR. LAWYER: I highly doubt it.
MR. LAYMAN: In light of the discussion we've just had, I'm even
more convinced than before that the lay adjuster and my son
should be allowed to handle my legal problems. To begin with, I
still believe that it makes absolutely no sense to allow me to
handle these problems myself yet to deny me the opportunity of
retaining a nonlawyer to protect me. The case you spoke of in which
the Supreme Court allowed inmates to get assistance from other
inmates in habeas corpus proceedings when no lawyer was available
seems to recognize that the assistance of a nonlawyer may be
more effective than self-representation. Second, the fact that only
attorneys are subject to discipline hardly seems to be a powerful
argument in light of Mr. Legislator's comments about the inadequacy of disciplinary enforcement. Third, the whole notion of
what constitutes the practice of law is entirely uncertain, since it
is seemingly dependent upon which court hears a particular case
at a particular time. If the public interest is such an important
consideration, you'd think that the concept of law practice would be
worked out with more consistency. How is the public interest served,
for example, by prohibiting divorce kits in some states, but allowing them in others? 4 Either some states are harming the
salesman of shares in mutual funds who prepared wills and trusts for his clients found to have
engaged in illegal practice of law); Florida Bar v. Irizarry, 268 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. 1972) (real
estate broker who drafted a contract for purchase and sale, and completed a warranty deed and
closing statement in a real estate transaction, permanently enjoined from such unauthorized
practice of law). See generally UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK, supra note 3.
83. Ste K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962). Pro-

fessor Llewellyn explains:
As one looks through the list of "encroachments" [by lay groups upon areas formerly the
exclusive province of lawyers], certain conclusions become hard to escape ....
Old lines
of business are certainly drifting or being sucked into non-Bar hands, but with real probability that this is because they are being done more adequately or more cheaply or both
by outside agencies ....
Abuses there are, on the side of lay "practitioners". But the
steady drift of business is too steady, it recurs in too many fields, to permit the conclusion
that the lay agencies, over the long haul are not giving satisfaction.
id. at 254 (emphasis added). See also Morgan, supra note 26, at 709. Professor Morgan stated:
In the specific fields of controversy about unauthorized practice [e.g., collection of debts,
executing real estate sales contracts, sale of divorce kits, probate work, tax advising, appearing before administrative agencies], . . . there are problems of correspondence,
document management and psychological judgment as to which lay experience may be as
important as intellectual training. In such situations, it seems entirely reasonable to expect that many lay persons would perform "legal services" at a level of quality equal to or
exceeding that of many lawyers.
Id. But see, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (nonlawyer made
serious mistakes attempting to handle legal problem); Lowe v. Presley, 86 Ga. App. 328, 71
S.E.2d 730 (1952) (same).
84. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
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public or the others are unnecessarily hassling it. Fourth, it seems
that a vast amount of law practice by nonlawyers already exists,
no matter how narrowly law practice is defined. Why grant this
privilege to legislators, ombudsmen, practitioners before certain
agencies, and others, yet demonstrate your concern about the
public interest by not allowing me to do what I think is best?
Finally, all this nonsense about the public interest fails to recognize that, in many areas, nonlawyers would probably be more
helpful to the client than lawyers. I just can't see why nonlawyers
should be barred from law practice, let alone why they should be
guilty of a crime for such conduct. I think you two should do
something to change things.
MR. LEGISLATOR: What would you suggest?
MR. LAYMAN: Obviously, I'd let people hire nonlawyers if they
wanted to.
MR. LAWYER: What about the attorney-client privilege, 85 the prohibition against conflicts of interest,8 6 and other protections afforded
by the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsi87
bility?
MR. LAYMAN: Fair enough; I'll assume these protections are not
meaningless as a practical matter. I'd simply recommend that the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility be extended
to apply to all nonlawyers doing legal work. 8 8

85. See ABA CODE, supra note 8, Canon 4, EC 4-1, 4-5 & 4-6, and DR 4-101(b). Canon 4
provides that "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." Id., Canon
4. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(b) requires that
a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third
person unless the client consents after full disclosure.
Id., DR 4-101(b) (footnotes omitted).
86. See ABA CODE, supra note 8, Canon 5, EC 5-1 to 5-24, and DR 5-101 to 5-105. Canon
5 provides that "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a
Client." Id., Canon 5. Ethical Consideration 5-1 suggests in part that "[the professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his
client and free of compromising influences and loyalties." Id., EC 5-1. These disciplinary rules
prohibit an attorney from accepting or continuing employment when other interests impair
his "independent professional judgment." Id., DR 5-101 to 5-105.
87. ABA CODE, supra note 8.
88. There are, of course, possible problems with applying the Code to nonlawyers. For
instance, should the attorney-client privilege apply? To the extent that nonlawyers are handling
legal problems, it becomes necessary that clients discuss matters with them freely, so the
rationale for the privilege would seem equally applicable in this situation. See ABA CODE,
supra note 8, EC 4-1. Similarly, the public harm from improper solicitation is no less grave
when egaged in by nonlawyers. Cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978) (state may forbid
in-person solicitation by lawyer for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in deception or improper influence upon clients).
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MR. LAWYER: How would the bar do that? It can't simply extend the
Code to apply to nonlawyers.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Since the unauthorized law prohibition is statutory, 89 any relaxation of the prohibition could easily be handled
by statutory reform. That same reform could extend the attorneys' code of ethics to nonlawyers who do legal work.
MR. LAYMAN: That seems to take care of your objection, Mr.
Lawyer.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Don't congratulate yourself yet. It seems to me
that lawyers have enough trouble enforcing their standards
among themselves. 90 How would we ever police the same standards as applied to nonlawyers?
MR. LAYMAN: Why not just create an agency to receive public complaints and investigate possible violations of ethical rules? If a
nonlawyer demonstrates that he can't do legal work, he could be
fined; 91 perhaps the agency could even prohibit him from further
engaging in such activity.
MR. LAWYER: I can't take this any more. This conversation is getting
out of hand. What started out as an intelligent discussion among
mature individuals has deteriorated into an exercise in futility. In
the first place, this idea would never pass. It's not in the public
interest and lawyers will see that it dies a quick death. Second, I
think people are sick of proposals that add more layers to the
constantly growing bureaucracy. 92 Indeed, your proposal would
be counterproductive; like most other agencies, yours would
wind up being captured by the very industry it is supposed to
regulate.
MR. LEGISLATOR: You mean like the Bar Association?
MR. LAWYER: I'll have you know that the lawyers have done a far
93
better job of policing themselves than have other professions.
But to continue with my objections, the scheme would expose
the public to abuse; it wouldn't do anything to prevent incompe-

89. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
91. Cf. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (nonlawyers found liable for
malpractice and required to pay compensatory damages to plaintiff); Latson v. Eaton, 341 P.2d
247 (Okla. 1959) (same).
92. Cf. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 48, at 218 (suggesting that bar enforcement of ethical
standards be replaced by public agency regulation and recognizing that such a proposal will be
attacked by lawyers as simply adding "another bureacuracy").
93. See id. at 220 (other professions have encountered ethical problems of an equal or more
serious nature; for example, it is said that medical discipline has deteriorated more than that of
the bar). See also Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 1, at 72.
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tent service by nonlawyers 9 4 the way licensing of attorneys ensures the provision of high quality legal service. 9 5 Moreover,
there would be nothing to make whole the victims of nonlawyer
incompetence. 96 And people would have no way to inform
themselves intelligently about which nonlawyers are competent,
assuming that some are. 97 In contrast, people presently can
retain a lawyer and know, without any research, that they are
getting someone competent to handle their legal matters. 9 8 Finally, the idea would lead to even greater inefficiency in the
courts. 99 Attorneys promote courtroom efficiency by sorting out
important facts, presenting them in a coherent manner, and
focusing on the critical legal issues. 10 0 Laymen, on the other
hand, would be unable to separate the important legal and factual
issues from the unimportant. The enormous backlog of our
courts' 01 would only grow worse. The whole idea seems utterly
ridiculous and I...
MR. LAYMAN: Excuse me. I can think of ways to respond to each of
your criticisms.
MR. LEGISLATOR: This seems like a complicated issue, but the idea is
intriguing and worth pursuing. Let's take this thing one step at a
time. And I would begin by taking issue with Mr. Lawyer's first
objection, namely, that the proposal couldn't pass. Mr. Layman's
idea, or something like it, would be very attractive to other professionals, such as accountants and real estate brokers, many of
whom sit on legislative bodies, or at least, exert a good deal of
10 2
lobbying influence.

94. But see note 91 and accompanying text supra.
95. But see the scores of cases concerning legal incompetence and neglect cited in
Gaudineer, Ethics and Malpractice, 26 DRAKE L. REv. 88 (1976).
96. But see notes 118-19 and accompanying text infra.
97. But see notes 123-27 and accompanying text infra.
98. But see note 95 supra.
99. But see notes 130-32 and accompanying text infra.
100. See R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY To MODERN TIMES 25 (1953). Pound

noted that
proper presentation of a case by a skilled advocate saves the time of courts and so public
time and expense. It helps the court by sifting out the relevant facts in advance, putting
them in logical order, working out their possible legal consequences, and narrowing the
questions which the court must decide to the really crucial points.

Id.
101. See generally Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1975, 61 A.B.A. J. 439 (1975).
102. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 1, at 170, 187 (noting ways in which lay
competitors have already used their influence to undercut unauthorized practice regulation). A
particularly interesting instance of lay groups' overcoming unauthorized practice rules through
the political process took place in Arizona in the early 1960's. Id. at 169-70. In 1961, the
Arizona Supreme Court ruled that title insurance companies and real estate brokers could not
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MR. LAWYER: I think you underestimate the lobbying influence of
the Bar Association. We're not a helpless and insular minority,

you know.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Perhaps other members of your profession do not

10 3
share your views.
MR. LAWYER: Even assuming for the moment that the proposal could
pass, I submit that it shouldn't. Let's focus on each of my earlier
points in detail. First, it seems wasteful to create another layer of
bureaucracy, particularly when the agency would most likely be
04
co-opted by the intended targets of the regulation.
MR. LAYMAN: I don't think the idea is wasteful at all. As I see it, the
proposal provides numerous important benefits.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Before you get to the benefits, let me focus on the
captured agency problem for a moment. It is likely that this
agency, unlike many others, would not be co-opted. It would
regulate many groups and individuals other than lawyers.
Lawyers will be anxious to find ethical violations or instances of
incompetence by nonlawyers; similarly, nonlawyers will seek to
show that lawyers are no better than they are. Natural rivalry
means that no one interest group is likely to capture the
agency. 10 5 As an additional safeguard, the agency could be staffed

prepare legal documents or give legal advice. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90
Ariz. 76, 97, 366 P.2d 1, 15 (1961). Following this decision, Arizona real estate brokers were
able to put a constitutional amendment on the ballot giving brokers broad rights to draft legal
instruments in the course of their work. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 1, at 170.
The proposed amendment was passed by a four to one margin in a popular election. Id. See
Marks, The Lawyers and the Realtors: Arizona's Experience, 49 A.B.A. J. 139 (1963); Riggs,
Unauthorized Practiceand the Public Interest: Arizona's Recent ConstitutionalAmendment, 37
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1964).
103. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 1, at 188. The authors maintain that
[t]hose lawyers whose clients include businesses that compete with the bar are likely to
oppose aggressive action [to enforce unauthorized practice prohibitions]. These are the
house counsel, trade association counsel, and lawyers who regularly do legal work for the
banks, real estate brokers, and others who compete with the bar....
But differences over bar association unauthorized practice policy exist even among
those lawyers who are not tied in with the bar's competitors.
Id.
104. For a sampling of numerous works on the "captured agency" problem, see, e.g., M.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965); T. Lows, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); Huntington, The ICC Re-examined: A Colloquy, 63 YALE L.J. 44 (1953); Huntington, The Marasmus
of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952);
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974).
105. The "natural rivalry" argument is analogous to the proposal that bureaucracies or
bureaucratic officials be given overlapping jurisdiction, forcing them to compete and thus to
become more efficient and less susceptible to "capture." See W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971). Hence, according to Mr. Legislator's view, there will
be competition among the proposed agency and the preexisting "regulatory" agencies, such as
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by individuals representing a wide variety of groups likely to
compete with lawyers, such as accountants, real estate brokers,
bankers, adjusters, engineers, insurance salesmen, and so forth.
Indeed, I think this agency would eliminate many of the impediments to effective disciplinary enforcement by the Bar Association. As to your comment that the legal profession already polices
itself better than other professions, certainly you're not saying
that the legal profession is doing a good job; in fact, it's doing a
106
lousy job, as the American Bar Association itself recognizes.
MR. LAYMAN: The suggestion to give representation in the agency to
numerous diverse interests pretty much destroys any argument
that the agency would be captured by any particular group.
MR. LAWYER: I know of no agency that has succeeded in remaining
independent, and your simplistic reasoning doesn't persuade me
that this one would be any different. In any event, your proposal
places the public at a great risk of abuse. Let me posit three
ways in which this is true. First, your scheme does nothing to
prevent incompetence among the nonlawyers who will be unleashed on the public. Certainly an occasional fine will not serve
as an effective deterrent. Second, how will victims be compensated for those egregious instances of incompetence or fraud that
are sure to arise? Third, the public will have no way of learning
which, if any, nonlawyers are in fact competent.
MR. LEGISLATOR: I know! We can require that nonlawyers be
licensed, the way nonlawyers are licensed to practice before the
United States Patent Office.
MR. LAYMAN: I'm not familiar with this.
MR. LEGISLATOR: In a nutshell, the Patent Office permits nonlawyers
to practice before it, but requires that lawyers and nonlawyers
alike pass certain qualifying examinations and demonstrate good
moral character.' 0 7 These licensing procedures of the Patent Office have worked incredibly well. Fears among lawyers that nonlawyers would harm the public have simply not been realized. Indeed, the Patent Office itself has indicated that nonlawyers have
performed every bit as well as lawyers. 10 8 I suppose we would
the Bar Association (which will continue to exist and advocate organization interests). Moreover,
professional groups, such as accountants, bankers, and real estate brokers, will compete with
one another, thus making "capture" even less likely to occur.
106. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
107. See Sperry v. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 384, 402 (1963).
108. See id. at 402, quoting COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OF THE GOVERNMENT,

REPORT OF THE TASK

FORCE ON

LEGAL SERVICES AND

PROCEDURE,

Part VI, Appendices and Charts, 158 (1955).
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simply leave the details of licensing to the individual states to
work out.
MR. LAWYER: Not so fast! Don't pull that debater's trick on me! How
would this licensing thing work?
MR. LEGISLATOR: I'm glad you asked that question. The regulatory
agency in each state would devise qualifications for and award
licenses to nonlawyers on a field-by-field basis. That is, a special
test would be set up for those wishing to practice tax law,
another test for those wishing to do trusts and estates work, and
so forth. Of course, the specialized categories would not arise
overnight. Initially, only those areas in which nonlawyers have
already expressed a desire to participate would be opened up to
them. 1 0 9 Other areas of practice would develop over
time as nonlawyers indicate an interest in them. The license would
be a privilege to practice only the type of law for which qualifications have been met. In contrast, lawyers would still be required
to pass a comprehensive bar examination, but would continue to
be free to engage in all areas of law practice. In addition, just as
lawyers must presently meet high moral standards, laymen would
similarly be required to demonstrate high moral character in
order to obtain and keep a license. To provide additional protection for the public, licensed nonlawyers would be required to
disclose that they are not lawyers. Such disclosure would enable
clients to make a more informed selection of whom to hire as
their legal advisor. Any nonlawyer attempting to engage in law
practice should be required to inform each client: first, that the
nonlawyer's license is not the same as a lawyer's license; second,
that the nonlawyer does not have a legal education and is not a
member of any bar; third, that legal training and testing provides
a special ability to spot legal problems and handle legal issues;
and fourth, that the client is taking some risk.
MR. LAWYER: Come on. Even assuming this senseless proposal were
to be given any consideration, some informed person would immediately point out that disclosure laws are pretty much a joke
because the people who need such disclosure are typically un-

109. The American Bar Association has entered into statements of principles with some competing professional groups. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 1, at 184-87. These
lay groups include: the American Bankers Association (Trust Division), certified public accountants, collection agencies, insurance companies and adjustors, life underwriters, life insurance
companies, liability insurers, realtors, and social workers. Id. at 185 n.71. These agreements
suggest only some of the many fields in which licensing could be established.
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sophisticated and uneducated and cannot or do not take advantage of detailed disclosure provisions. 110
MR. LEGISLATOR: Before you get to the problems of disclosure, Mr.
Lawyer, I want to explain to Mr. Layman why licensing of nonlawyers is critical. Licensing ensures that one meets minimal
qualifications for performing a particular service.
MR. LAYMAN: Then give the nonlawyer one chance. If he messes
things up, bar him from practicing law.
MR. LAWYER: You mean like the "one bite" rule?
MR. LAYMAN: The what?
MR. LAWYER: The "one bite" rule. That's the rule that shields the
owner of a dog from liability until after the dog has demonstrated
its viciousness by attacking someone. 1 11
MR. LEGISLATOR: But there's nothing to take away from one who
messes up a case, since he doesn't have a license to begin with.
So how do we bar him from practicing? Moreover, there are
other reasons for requiring licensing. As I've already noted,
licensing ensures that one holding himself out as capable of handling legal problems has at least minimal qualifications. Second,
and related to the first, we avoid imposing on the public the
costs of learning which nonlawyers have at least a reasonable
level of competence. Third, we make sure that individuals holding themselves out as capable of practicing law are of sound
moral character. For example, we would not want someone who
has been convicted three times for securities fraud to practice
securities law.
MR. LAYMAN: You may have a point with that licensing thing. I'm
just not sure. It seems to me that if we truly adhere to individual
choice, we should allow people to choose any nonlawyer to represent them, not just licensed nonlawyers.
MR. LAWYER: Mr. Legislator, do you really think that loss of a
license by a nonlawyer will serve as any sort of deterrent? Big
deal! Someone loses a license to practice one narrow area of law.
On the other hand, lawyers have a lot more to lose if they lose
their licenses. That's just one more reason why we should keep
things the way they are.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Have you ever stopped to think that it may be
precisely because lawyers have so much to lose that disciplinary

110. See Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV.
1285, 1320-22 (1966). But see notes 113-15 and accompanying text infra.
111. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 76, at 501-02 (4th ed. 1971).
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proceedings are rarely filed and, hence, enforcement has become
such a farce?112
MR. LAWYER: I doubt it. But moving on, why doesn't one of you
discuss my objection to the disclosure requirement, namely, that
disclosure laws don't work?
MR. LEGISLATOR: I think you underestimate the value of disclosure.
First, disclosure serves to inform a potential client that he may
not get the same level of service from a nonlawyer as from a
lawyer. 11 3 Second, and related to the first, disclosure has had at
least some impact on consumer choices. 114 Third, evidence demonstrates that one reason why disclosure has not been more
successful is that much of what has been disclosed has been
either irrelevant or else written in technical jargon comprehensible to almost no one, including many lawyers."l 5
MR. LAWYER: How do you know so much about disclosure?
MR. LEGISLATOR: In my role as a member of the judiciary committee
of this state's legislature, I've heard more than my fair share of
hearings about disclosure.
MR. LAWYER: Disclosure aside, what do we do about victims of incompetent performance by nonlawyers? Are these people to be
left remediless? I've asked this question already but both of you
have ignored it.
MR. LAYMAN: Why not allow malpractice suits?
MR. LAWYER: That wouldn't do much good, particularly in the case

of one who in good faith acts as best as he knows how, but who
just happens to make a mistake. A nonlawyer would not be held

112. See ABA SPECIAL CoMM., supra note 47, at 7 (suggesting that mere institution of disciplinary proceeding is so harsh in terms of damage to an attorney's investment in his education
and practice that such proceedings are rarely filed).
113. Cf. NATIONAL COMM. ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES 176 (1972) (discussing Federal Reserve Board study showing that consumer awareness of
interest rates increased in 15 months after enactment of Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1605 (1976), thus indicating that disclosure requirements play a significant role in informing the public). See also Brandt & Day, Information Disclosure and Consumer Behavior: An
Empirical Evaluation of Truth-In-Lending, 7 MICH. J.L. REF. 297, 300-03, 306 (1974).
114. See Brandt & Day, supra note 113, at 313 (admitting that disclosure has had "'amodest
influence on shopping behavior"). But see Jordan & Warren, supra note 110, at 1302-03, 130910, 1315 (expressing doubts that there is much credit-shopping, and arguing that, in small deals,
shopping for best credit terms is seldom as worthwhile as shopping for the desired goods).
115. See David, Protecting Consumers From Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv. 841, 843-44,
847-53, 855-56, 897-98 (1977) (empirical analysis indicating that disclosures are often too lengthy
and complex to be understood, and concluding that disclosures should be limited to material
and simple facts or ideas).
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to the standard of a reasonable lawyer under the circumstances;
116
he would be held to the standard of a reasonable nonlawyer.
MR. LAYMAN: Then why not simply hold nonlawyers to the same
standards as lawyers? 117
MR. LEGISLATOR:

That's a great idea. Holding nonlawyers to the

same malpractice standards as lawyers would not only serve to
compensate victims, but it would also supplement license revocation as a deterrent against incompetent performance by nonlawyers. l8
MR. LAWYER: But even that proposal would not help victims in many
cases.
MR. LAYMAN: Such as?
MR. LAWYER: What if the harm is too small to make it worth undergoing litigation costs? What if the client does not know he received poor service, for example, when the damages recovered by
a nonlawyer are much less than those which an attorney could
have obtained? What if the nonlawyer, having already been sued
many times, is judgment proof?
MR. LAYMAN: But don't all of these problems exist under the current
system with respect to incompetent attorneys?
MR. LEGISLATOR:

Maybe my licensing idea would improve things

over the current system by dealing with the problems just mentioned.
MR. LAWYER: How?
MR. LAYMAN: How?
MR. LEGISLATOR: We

could charge those who obtain licenses an an-

nual fee and use the money to compensate victims of minor instances of incompetence. 1 19 The licensing agency would be responsible for determining when and how much compensation is
justified. This is just one more reason why licensing is a good
idea. Licensing would add to the benefits of Mr. Layman's idea.
MR. LAYMAN: Speaking of benefits, let's look at the benefits of my
proposal. I suppose I've been too dogmatic in not appreciating
116. Cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 111, § 32, at 161 (indicating that professionals are held to
higher standard than laymen, but implying that the result would be different if a layman misrepresents himself as having all the skills of a professional).
117. See Morgan, supra note 26, at 709 n.26 (citing cases in which nonlawyers have already
been held to the standard of a reasonable lawyer).
118. See notes 111-12 and accompanying text supra.
119. See Comment, Pennsylvania Clients' Security Fund-How Secure is the Public?, 22
VILL. L. REv. 452 (1977) (discussing an analogous "client security fund" system in Pennsylvania). See generally Bryan, Clients' Security Fund Ten Years Later, 55 A.B.A. J. 757 (1969);
Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation, 3 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 917, 1009-11 (1976).
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the benefits of the licensing idea. Individual choice is only one
aspect, albeit an extremely important one, of the "public interest." It seems to me that the public interest is promoted to a
much greater extent under my system, combined with the licensing scheme, than under the current system. This is not to denigrate the role of individual choice; even under the licensing
scheme an individual would have much greater choice than he does
presently. That is, under the scheme, an individual can choose:
a) to represent himself; b) to hire a lawyer; or c) to hire any
nonlawyer meeting minimal qualifications. In addition to the significant increase in individual choice, another clear benefit is the
overall cost savings for legal services that would accrue. Two
separate factors would lead to such a savings. First, nonlawyers
would frequently charge less than lawyers for performing the
same service. 120 Second, increased competition in the performance of legal services, resulting from the entry of nonlawyers
into the market, would lead to a reduction in the cost of legal
services by lawyers and, ultimately, in the overall cost of resolving legal problems. 1 21 Still another benefit from the proposed
scheme is the improved discipline likely to result from competition between lawyers and other individuals performing legal services. That is, lawyers, eager to maintain their position of being

120. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 1, at 194 ("Lay legal services often are
performed at lower cost than if the work were done by lawyers"); cf. Leff, Medical Devices and
Paramedical Personnel: A Preliminary Context for Emerging Problems, 1967 WASH. U. L.Q.
332, 336 (1967) (recognizing that increased efficiency would result in the medical field by allowing less difficult tasks to be performed by nonphysicians); Comment, Legal Paraprofessionals and Unauthorized Practice, 8 HARV. C.R. & C.L. L. REv. 104, 105 (1973)
("Paraprofessionals may be used to increase efficiency in performing legal functions, to reduce
the cost of providing legal services, and to make the delivery mechanism more accessible to low
and moderate income communities").
121. See Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va.
1977), vacated and remanded on proceduralground, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 941 (1978). In Surety Title, the plaintiff title company proposed "to lower the cost of title
insurance by eliminating the services of an attorney" and using "trained lay personnel" in connection with insuring titles in land transactions. 431 F. Supp. at 302-03. It was "uncontroverted
that [this] . . . approach would result in the consumer receiving greaterservices than presently
offered at a substantially lower cost. " Id. at 303 (emphasis added). The Virginia State Bar issued
an advisory opinion stating that the title company would be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law if it carried out this proposal. Id. at 302. Plaintiff then sued alleging that the issuing
of advisory opinions relating to the unauthorized practice of law, coupled with the threat of
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys who aided nonlawyers in unauthorized practice, constituted an illegal restraint of commerce in the area of title insurance. Id. at 299-300 & n. 1. The
district court concluded that the bar association's conduct did "not act to advance the consumer
interest, but merely that of the attorney. It is neither necessary to, nor are its anticompetitive
effects reasonable in light of, the justifying state interest." Id. at 308-09. See also Reeves, UPL:
The Lawyers' Monopoly Under Attack, 51 FLA. BAR J. 600, 607-09 (1977).
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singularly competent to handle legal problems, will police with
zeal the actions of nonlawyers. Similarly, nonlawyers, eager to
establish that lawyers are not singularly competent-or that nonlawyers are not singularly incompetent-will watch carefully for
12 2
instances of lawyer incompetence or unethical conduct.
MR. LAWYER: Sorry to interrupt; I know you haven't had a chance to
list all of your alleged benefits yet, but I have to ask once again:
how will the public know which nonlawyers are incompetent?
And don't throw the licensing scheme at me; you know as well as
I that just because someone can pass some mickey mouse test
doesn't mean he can handle difficult legal problems created in a
society dedicated to the rule of law.
MR. LAYMAN: Your touching rhetoric does not mask the stupidity of
your argument.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Now gentlemen...
MR. LAYMAN: How does the current system reveal to the public
which lawyers are skilled merely in test taking? Don't throw the
legal profession's mickey mouse disciplinary enforcement at me;
you know as well as I that enforcement has been pretty much a
joke.'

23

Word of mouth has adequately sufficed to reveal which
124
competent and which are incompetent.
are
lawyers
MR. LAYMAN: Maybe in a town with a population of two
hundred.1 25 At any rate, I have several responses. First, to play
your game, news of nonlawyer incompetence will travel by word
of mouth. Second, competition will force the louses out of business. 12 6 Third, incompetent nonlawyers will have their licenses
taken away. And to supplement these safeguards, I have still
another idea: the regulatory agency should keep data concerning
both lawyers and licensed nonlawyers. Specifically, the agency
would encourage feedback from the public relating to the quality
MR. LAWYER:

122. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
123. See notes 47-48, 106 & 112 and accompanying text supra.
124. But see C. WEHRINGER, WHEN AND HOW TO CHOOSE AN ATTORNEY 71-82 (2d ed.

1979) (listing available methods of locating an attorney, e.g., using yellow pages, questioning
friends, searching in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, and consulting bar referral services); cf. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 1, at 117-18 (attacking inadequacies of bar
referral services because they do not indicate which attorneys are competent or better than
others, and because attorneys using the service to get business are often inexperienced).
125. Cf. J. CA.RLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 155-61 (1962) (discussing fact that Code of

Professional Responsibility is geared to small towns).
126. See A. LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING 118-26 (1976); P. SAMUELSON,

ECONOMICS

357-78, 428-512 (8th ed. 1970).
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of legal services they've received. This would lead to the establishment of a collection of consumer complaints to which every
citizen would have access. A file would be kept on each lawyer
and each licensed nonlawyer. Through media advertising, the
agency would appeal to citizens to report their complaints. A
"Better Business Bureau for Legal Services" would thus be
created.
MR. LAWYER: But citizens wouldn't bother to report minor mishaps,
would they? Files would show only the egregious cases; day-today incompetence would continue unabated.
MR. LEGISLATOR:

Quite the contrary; you're forgetting about my

agency compensation fund idea for victims of minor instances of
incompetence. The likelihood of compensation makes it reasonable to believe that such minor mishaps will be reported. As to
large mishaps, citizens would be motivated to report their complaints to the agency out of sheer revenge. But just to make sure
that the most serious errors are not ignored, the agency would
keep records of all court cases in which lawyers or licensed nonlawyers have been sued for malpractice.
MR. LAYMAN: That's exactly right. Indeed, now that you mention the
compensation point, I think it should be reiterated that this feature would assist those who presently lose out because the cost of
litigation exceeds the extent of harm suffered from inadequate
27
legal representation. 1
MR. LAWYER: Have you finished listing the benefits of your scheme?
MR. LAYMAN:
MR. LAWYER:

Why, do you have anything to add?

Certainly not in the way of benefits. I do have some
criticisms I want to emphasize, however. First, you still haven't
told me what your proposal does to protect against the fact that
nonlawyers are unable to spot general legal problems. I raised
this question before, but you didn't really respond to it.
MR. LAYMAN: Okay, let me answer this criticism. If the risk is real,
then nonlawyers will have an incentive to refer cases to lawyers
for the purpose of reviewing the case for buried legal problems.
Similarly, if the risk is substantial, it is likely that a market in
"general issue review" by lawyers will develop. Lawyers would,
for a fee, proof the work of nonlawyers to ensure that no buried

127. Although a number of states have client security funds, see authorities cited in note 119
supra, these schemes have been largely a failure, in part because of insufficient funding. See,
e.g., Comment, supra note 119, at 459 (during years 1969-74 claims of $249,065 were approved,
but only $63,676 was actually paid out to claimants).
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legal problems were overlooked. Such a service would be useful
to clients not wishing to pay the high hourly rates charged by
lawyers 12 8 but nonetheless desiring assurance that problems of a
general legal nature are not overlooked. In short, if lawyers truly
have this valuable service to offer, one can rest assured that a
market for such services will arise. On the other hand, I'm not at
all certain that the problems you raise are even that significant to
begin with.
MR. LAWYER: You're wrong; the problems are very significant. And
your response is unrealistic; it assumes that lawyers will put their
necks on the line by giving nonlawyers opinion letters as to the
existence or nonexistence of these general legal issues to which
we've been referring.
MR. LAYMAN: Oh that's beautiful! I wish I had that one on tape! Do
you realize what you've said? First you make the bold assertion
that lawyers have this vitally important and unique skill. Then
you claim that lawyers are not comfortable enough with that skill
to market it. Once again, if the skill is a valuable one, a market
for it will develop.
MR. LAWYER: I'm still not persuaded by your arguments.
MR. LAYMAN: I didn't expect that you would be. Being a lawyer, you
can't exactly approach these matters with an open mind. You
129
have an economic interest in preserving the status quo.
MR. LEGISLATOR: Gentlemen, gentlemen. Let's keep this thing orderly. And let's try to wind things up. Mr. Lawyer, do you have
any other objections you wish to raise?
MR. LAWYER: I would like to make one final point before we drop
this dramatic yet dangerous debate. Much earlier, I made the
point that your proposal would lead to increased inefficiency in
the trial of cases. 130 Thus, far, you've failed to meet this criticism head on.
MR. LAYMAN: Are you suggesting that nonlawyers, like my son the
English professor, cannot do a good job in the courtroom?
MR. LAWYER: Well, with all due respect to your son, who, by the
way, I cannot believe is more articulate than you, I am saying
that nonlawyers generally cannot do an adequate job of trying a
case.

128. For other examples of how the cost of professional services can be reduced by the use of
paraprofessionals, see sources cited note 120 supra.
129. See Johnstone, supra note 2, at 5; K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 83, at 255-56.
130. See note 99-101 and accompanying text supra.
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MR. LEGISLATOR: Even if a litigation license were required as a prerequisite to trying cases?
MR. LAWYER: I doubt that an adequate test could be devised for this
purpose. Anyway, I suspect that some incompetents can slip past
any test you might propose.
MR. LEGISLATOR: I'd agree. That's precisely the point Mr. Chief Justice Burger has been making in recent years: law school training
and bar examinations do not ensure that lawyers will be able to
131
try cases competently.
MR. LAYMAN: Mr. Legislator, does that mean that you do not think
that a litigation licensing procedure would be sufficient to meet
the objection?
MR. LEGISLATOR: It would, with these qualifications. I would give
each trial judge power: a) to recommend that a nonlawyer's
license to try cases be revoked; or b) to actually forbid the nonlawyer to try a particular case before him. On the other hand, if
a judge dismisses a nonlawyer from a case and the client cannot
afford a lawyer, then the court must appoint one for him. I was quite
disturbed to learn that a nonlawyer can be punished for assisting
someone when the court refuses to appoint a lawyer.' 3 2 Provided these qualifications are incorporated into the scheme, I
think that licensed trial nonlawyers could indeed serve the public
interest.
MR. LAWYER: We've reached a deadlock.
MR. LAYMAN: Before we depart, I'd like to spell out the proposal in
its entirety. Up until now, we've simply looked at it piece by
piece as it evolved. What we've come up with is something like
this:
1) Nonlawyers would be permitted to practice in particular fields
of law of obtaining a special license for each field; 133

131. See Burger, supra note 101, at 440 (discussing the numerous lawyers with "little experience in litigation and a minimum of training for the difficult and exacting task of prosecuting or
defending a criminal case"). But see Carrigan, Independant [sic] Trial Lawyers: Freedom's Trustees, TRIAL, July, 1978, at 53, 55 (questioning the soundness of Burger's claims).
132. See Hackin v. Arizona, 102 Ariz. 218, 427 P.2d 910, appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 143
(1967). The establishment of legal aid programs for the poor has not rendered this issue moot.
In spite of the Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1976), the fact remains
that millions of poor people do not have access to any free legal services. See Cramton, Promise
and Reality in Legal Services, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 670, 674 (1976) ("an estimated twelve million
(40.5%) of the nation's twenty-nine million poor live in areas where there are no legal services
at all. Inflation and unemployment increase that number even more"). The proposal made in
the text accompanying this footnote would resolve the Hackin problem noted above, wherein a
nonlawyer was punished for helping someone when the court did not appoint an attorney. See
note 42 supra.
133. See notes 107-12 and accompanying text supra.
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2) The Code of Professional Responsibility would be legislatively
extended to apply to licensed nonlawyers doing legal work; 134
3) Licensed nonlawyers could have their licenses revoked for incompetence or ethical violations; 135
4) Nonlawyers would be subject to the same high standards as
lawyers in malpractice actions; 136
5) Annual licensing fees would provide funds for compensating
victims of inadequate services where the loss involved is not
large enough to justify pursuit of malpractice remedies; 137
6) A governmental agency composed of both lawyers and nonlawyers would be set up to perform the foregoing functions; 138
7) This agency would also maintain comprehensive data relating
39
to the quality of service by lawyers and licensed nonlawyers.1
I have already demonstrated the benefits of each element of the
proposal.
MR. LAWYER: And I've demonstrated the pitfalls of each element.
MR. LEGISLATOR: At a minimum, the discussion has revealed the
need to consider with an open mind the possibility and desirability of opening up the practice of law to nonlawyers on a field-byfield basis. For example, we could consider allowing accountants
to handle certain tax matters, bank trust officers to do estate
planning, and so forth.
MR. LAWYER: The only thing this discussion has revealed to me is
the need to get rid of the privilege one has to represent himself,
at least in those areas in which such a privilege is not constitutionally protected. 140 Perhaps there may also be a need for increased specialization in the legal profession, particularly in the
41
trial area. 1
MR. LAYMAN: The only thing this discussion has not revealed to me
is how any of this helps me with my pending legal battles. Isn't
there anything that can be done?
MR. LAWYER: The fact is, you're out of luck. The law is the law. And
in a society dedicated to the rule of law, there is nothing that can

134. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 109-12 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 116-18 and accompanying text supra.
137. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
138. See notes 91, 104-09 & 127 and accompanying text supra.
139. See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 21-27 and accompanying text supra.
141. See generally Burger, supra note 101; note 131 and accompanying text supra. See also
Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 1, at 131-59.
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be done but abide by the unauthorized practice of law statute. 142 Speaking of this statute, I'm puzzled, Mr.Legislator, as
to how you, as a draftsman, could attack the rationale of your
law.
MR. LEGISLATOR: I'm elected to represent the interests of the people
of this great state. I consider this my duty. When carrying out
this duty requires me to reconsider the soundness of a seemingly
valid law, I'm not afraid to admit that I may have been wrong. I
no longer see how the public interest is served by our current
rigid statute prohibiting the practice of law by nonlawyers. Service to the public frequently requires that one admit he's made a
mistake. Can you do likewise, Mr. Lawyer?

142. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
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